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Term vs. Whole Life Insurance 
"For more than 20 years, Philip Wilmot, plunked money each month in 
a whole-life insurance policy, hoping he could tap into what would become 
a huge nest egg by the time he retired. 
"But four years ago, a friend looked over Wilmot's $200,000 policy 
and delivered some startling news: The insurance company was making a 
bigger profit on Wilmot's money than Wilmot was. 
"So he cashed in the whole life policy at age 45. The payment: 
$16,000. 
"Today Wilmot is paying $58 a month for $100,000 term policy and 
invests $150 a month that he used to spend on insurance in three mutual 
funds." (Stanton, 1993) 
Is this scenario the norm or exception? Are there benefits to the 
extra cost of whole-life insurance? How much does one need to earn when 
"investing the difference" to justify the extra risk entailed in purchasing 
term life insurance? 
This is study comparing term to whole life insurance. These two 
life insurance vehicles will be compared using the after-tax dollar figure 
of the surrender value or death benefit (for the whole life policy) and the 
total after-tax value of the "difference" and/or death benefit (for the 
term life insurance policy). These comparisons are not intended to be 
used to extrapolate the average rate of return needed in the future to 
justify the extra risk inherent in term life insurance. The nominal rates 
of return are merely used to illustrate the comparability of the "buy term 
and invest the difference" strategy to whole life insurance from 1975 to 
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1994. If there had been a different inflation and/or interest rate during 
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the years used in this project simulation, the resulting nominal rates of 
return would have different. 
This study in response to a number of one-sided research articles 
and statements claiming that one type of insurance product is better than 
another under any circumstances. Some examples of pro-term life 
insurance information are : 
Russ Stanton's August 1993 article in the Chicago Tribune. Stanton 
seems to prove that all a policyholder needs to earn is 8% on the invested 
"difference" to be a better value than whole life insurance. Guy Halverson 
of the Christian Science Monitor writes that "too many people take out 
whole life insurance instead of cheaper term life insurance." The problem 
with much of these statements are that they are hasty generalizations 
based on incomplete or inconclusive data. Stanton focuses on how 
expensive a whole life insurance premium is compared to a term premium 
but neglects the fact that by "investing the difference" the cost to the 
policyholder for either policy is the same. 
Many advocates of whole life insurance do not even back their 
statements with research. They just resort to name calling to attempt to 
prove their point. Shelley Lee's article in the Business Atlanta has some 
examples of this. Sellers of cash-value insurance, according to Lee, call 
term life insurance the "grand delusion" because agents who sell term 
often deceive prospective clients about the potential returns and benefits 
of term life insurance. They even label some sellers of term life 
insurance as "scourges" to the life insurance industry. However, some 
advocates of term respond by saying cash-value life insurance is actually 
"trash value" life insurance. 
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Let us look at the nature of these two types of insurance policies. 
Term Ufe Insurance 
A majority of heads of households are covered by life insurance, 
either through personal or company plans. About 366 million insurance 
policies were in effect at the end of 1994. According to the American 
Council of Life Insurance these policies totaled $12 trillion of life 
insurance in force. (Halverson, 1995) 
Term life insurance is purchased for a specific period term, usually 
one, five, or ten years and if the insured dies during the term the death 
benefit is paid to the beneficiary. At the end of the period, the policy 
expires. The policy is then renewed or a new one is purchased. Annual 
renewable term life insurance starts with a low premium, increases every 
year, and is automatically renewable. However, level premium term life 
insurance guarantees a premium for ten, fifteen, or twenty years before 
dramatically increasing upon renewal. This presumes that the insured. 
does not become an unacceptably high risk on the basis of health or age. 
An important piece of information to note when choosing a specific 
type of life insurance is that a policyholder always pays term insurance 
premiums with after-tax dollars. For example, a $3,000 term insurance 
premium that provides $250,000 of coverage at age 60 would require 
before tax earnings of $4,166 for a person in the 28% income tax bracket. 
(Hansen, 1995) 
The idea behind term life insurance is that as the mortality cost 
increases with the insured's age, the premium increases as well. This is 
because the probability of death increases with age. 
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If an insured needs coverage for more than twenty years, a whole 
life policy might be more appropriate than term. A general rule of thumb 
is that an insured needs to hold a whole life insurance policy for a 
minimum of twelve years to be cost effective. The reason for this is that 
a whole life policy is considered permanent insurance. The insured is 
guaranteed a death benefit under most circumstances, and the premium is 
fixed as long as the policy is in force. However, the fixed premium rate is 
generally five times as high as a term policy of similar death benefit. 
This is because the premium for a whole life insurance policy, over time, 
establishes a cash-value that is liquidated to keep the premium at a 
constant level even while mortality charges increase with age. Initially 
much of the premium goes towards commissions, marketing, overhead, 
etc. and really does not start building cash-value until after the first four 
years. The cash-value is usually invested in the insurance company's 
general account which earns a return directly related to the investments 
of the insurer. Some of the newer types of whole life insurance allow the 
insured to choose the investment vehicles for the cash-value. For basic 
whole life insurance, upon death of the insured, the beneficiary receives 
only the death benefit and the cash-value remains with the insurer. 
However, some whole life policies allow the beneficiary to participate in 
the reserve or cash-value as well as the profits of the insurance company. 
Regardless, the policy owner may borrow money against the amount in the 
cash-value or can cash in the policy for the surrender value of the policy 
minus any outstanding loans. If the policy owner surrenders the policy 
within the first five to ten years the insurance company will generally 
charge a stiff surrender charge. These charges help the insurance 
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company recoup some of the expenses, such as commissions, incurred in 
extending a whole life policy initially. If an insured were to surrender a 
policy after holding it for a short period of time, the insurance company 
would face investment risks associated with selling long-term securities 
on short notice. (Damato, 1995), (Tosto, 1995), (Stanton, 1993) 
Buying Term and Investing the Difference 
Because whole life insurance costs substantially more than term 
life insurance for the same level of protection, some experts advise their 
clients to purchase term life insurance and invest the difference they 
would have paid towards the whole life policy. This strategy is referred 
to as "buying term and investing the difference" (BTIO). As the insured 
pursues B110, a substantial nest egg should accumulate. This nest egg 
should enable the insured to renew the term policy with a lower death 
benefit or fund the higher premium if the same death benefit is 
maintained. In any case, the insured should still have money in his/her, 
nest egg in case of premature death or becoming an uninsurable risk. A 
decreasing death benefit with an older insured should allow the insured 
either to decrease or maintain the level of the initial premium of the term 
policy by ultimately decreasing the amount of coverage. 
Project Purpose 
The purpose of this project is to show that term and whole life 
insurance both have places in the life insurance market. I test the 
hypothesis that no single insurance product is right for everyone. Many 
insurance companies will tell prospective clients that whole life is the 
only real life insurance to consider. On the other hand, there is a growing 
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number of single-line term life insurance companies that claim the other 
insurance companies are not giving a.1I the information to their customers. 
I believe my research will show that neither of these claims are entirely 
true. Both term and whole life insurance have their merits as well as 
their pitfalls that ultimately must be taken into consideration before a 
decision is made by the insured. 
Term Life Insurance Background Information 
The need for life insurance typically declines as children grow up 
and become independent. As dependents move away, the need to support 
family members declines. As other savings and investments gradually 
grow into a satisfactory estate, the need for life insurance declines as 
well. In effect, increased wealth allows people to self insure. 
When term life insurance is purchased, an "invest the difference" 
strategy often accompanies it. This strategy implies that the insured 
invests the money saved by not purchasing a whole life insurance policy 
into some other type of investment vehicle preferably a mutual fund. The 
idea is that the insured will earn a higher return than the cash-value of a 
whole life policy and pay less for the policy itself because term life 
insurance is inherently less expensive. The phrase "buy term and invest 
the difference" has become so popular in recent years because the life 
insurance industry has practically abandoned its emphasis on the 
fundamental objective of life insurance: the death benefit. The very 
nature of life insurance is to provide income for your dependents if you 
die prematurely. However, the new life insurance vehicles like universal 
life as well as "investing the difference" from term life insurance, to an 
extent, concentrate more on investment benefits. These types of life 
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insurance policies are sold primarily based on the fact that the need for 
life insurance declines as retirement approaches. By the same reasoning, 
the need for retirement income increases as retirement draws nearer. 
Even though a BllO strategy is implemented on the basis of providing 
retirement income, a cash-value policy can provide retirement income for 
the insured as well. The insured can surrender the policy at some point 
when cash is needed or just take out a loan secured by the cash-value the 
policy had earned thus far. (Scully, 1994) 
Arthur Lynch Williams is credited with initiating the dramatic 
increase in term life insurance sales in the 1980's. Williams was a high 
school coach from Columbus, Georgia. He decided to disregard the 
gentlemen's agreement of the insurance industry not to raid another 
company's customers and in-force policies. Williams had more than 
200,000 people working for A. L. Williams insurance Company at its peak 
in 1990. (Lee, 1993) 
Williams' philosophy of "buying term and investing the difference!' 
was (and still is) based on the simplicity of unbundled term products. 
Although many large insurance companies carry term in their product 
lines, it is not widely sold. Term sales, although increasing, account for 
only 22% of insurance sales based on premiums. This is primarily because 
the insurance industry still has not accepted term life insurance as 
viable, profit generating product. Defenders of term life insurance would 
claim this is because term does not provide the same large up front 
commission that whole life insurance sales generate. Therefore, term 
advocates would claim that sellers of whole life insurance are not giving 
potential customers all the facts in order to make an intelligent decision 
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about which product to choose. They are just trying to sell the product 
that earns them the highest commission. (Lee, 1993) 
98% of all term policies never result in a payoff; people let them 
lapse, expire, or the issuing companies go out business. Much of this 
stems from the lack of customer focus from the current providers of term 
life insurance. Many insurance agents do not spend the time with the 
policy owner to make sure the policy is renewed and does not lapse. The 
policy does not generate enough profit to warrant the extra time needed to 
create a good relationship with the customer. This is the reasoning many 
insurance companies, that advocate whole life insurance, use when it 
comes to term life. The cash-value policy, on the other hand, generates a 
substantial initial commission based the higher premium. (Lee, 1993) 
Term products generally offer more flexibility than do whole life 
products-lower premiums in the early years when income replacement and 
protection needs of spouse and children are greatest. This flexibility 
requires that there be higher premiums in later years when insurance 
needs decline and an estate has been accumulated. Term's defenders 
maintain insurance companies too frequently sell whole life to young 
people who cannot save by their own discipline by stressing the forced 
savings element. $3,000 a year for a $500,000 whole life policy is an 
expensive commitment for a 30 year old who has two young children, a 
new mortgage, and cannot afford to fully fund a 401 (k) plan. (Lee, 1993) 
If a whole life insurance policy is dropped after only 3 years (as 1/3 
of whole life policies are) the buyer has nothing to show for it; surrender 
charges are stiff and the cash-value is generally less than premiums for a 
minimum of 7 years. Advocates of term claim that term is neither an 
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investment nor a gamble won only by dying. Term is pure life insurance 
protection, a "cost of living". (Lee, 1993) 
When Williams sold his Atlanta-based company and its army of 
"termites" to Primerica Corporation in 1983 because he became the target 
of investigation by the U.S. attorney in Jacksonville, Florida, for 
conspiracy to undermine a competitor's business, many in the industry 
wondered if Primerica, a New York-based financial services conglomerate, 
would attempt to mainstream the company by following the lead of the 
rest of the insurance industry and sell whole life over term life insurance. 
This was not the case. (Wright, 1993), (Lee, 1993) 
Primerica Financial Services (PFS) is still the nation's largest 
issuer of term life insurance and the second largest of all insurance 
companies after Prudential as measured by policy face amount. Primerica 
has led the industry in eight of the past 11 years in selling the most 
individual term insurance policies, earning the nickname "king of term." 
Primerica Financial Services collected more than $187 million in 
premiums in 1992, sold more than $46 billion in face amount of insurance, 
and had more than $3 billion under management in a proprietary mutual 
fund family. (Higginbotham, 1996), (Lee, 1993), (Wright, 1993) 
Primerica works much like Amway, using a multi-level marketing 
strategy to increase sales. By selling policies and recruiting other 
salespeople who do the same, a Primerica salesperson can earn more and 
be promoted to the position of Regional Vice President. This strategy has 
resulted in a nationwide "termite" sales force of more than 100,000 
people. (Wright, 1993) 
While A.L. Williams' organization sold millions of term policies, the 
rest of the industry responded with products such as universal and 
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variable life insurance. T~lis has led to increased competition within the 
insurance industry as a whole which has been reflected in lower premiums 
for people considering the purchase of a life insurance policy. Universal 
life proved to be particularly popular during the high interest rate climate 
of the early to mid-1980's. But as many holders of CD's learned, returns 
plummeted as interest rates plunged. Compounding this were investment 
portfolios loaded with junk bonds, speculative real estate, and the high­
profile failure and seizure of some large companies. By contrast, the PFS' 
products have no return or cash-value because PFS sells only term life 
products which do not provide a cash-value savings element. However, its 
investment portfolio, according to Standard and Poors, is pristine. (Lee, 
1993) 
"Investing the difference" may sound good in theory but many 
consumers spend the difference. The average American saves less than 5% 
of his/her income per year. Primerica's own statistics on the number of 
accounts its customers have in both their proprietary mutual-fund family 
and non-proprietary funds also offered by its agents indicate only between 
40% and 50% of PFS policyholders invest the difference. However, PFS 
cannot track customers who may invest outside the PFS family of funds. 
(Lee, 1993), (Kiplinger, 1994) 
Level term products are available from most companies that sell 
Annual Renewable Term (ART) policies. The basic difference between ART 
and level premium term is that the premium for level term remains 
constant for a predetermined period of time. After the five, ten, or 
twenty year policy period expires, the policy owner has the option to 
renew the contract. However, the mortality costs that were not added 
into the cost of the insurance premium initially will have to be added upon 
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renewal. This will cause the new premium to be extremely high because 
the chance of the policy owner dying would be much greater than it was 
when the policy was first purchased. The advantage to the company is 
improved persistency because policyholders do not face an increased 
premium each year. As a result, policyholders are more likely to pay the 
renewal premium. The advantage to the agent is higher commissions for 
the higher first year level term premium. (Gold, 1994) 
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) 
approved a model regulation that would require many insurance companies 
to set aside larger reserves when they make long-term rate promises. 
Level term policies are an ideal choice for some insurance buyers who 
know their need will end at a particular point of time. If the guarantee 
period exceeds the insured's need, the premium is locked in at a 
reasonable rate. However, if the policyholder wants to continue coverage 
beyond the initial guarantee period the premium will go up dramatically. 
Many insurers require a medical exam in order to continue coverage at a 
favorable rate, otherwise the premium rate goes up even more. A good 
example is a 40 year old man buying a $250,000 10 year level term policy 
from North American Company. The rate is guaranteed at $330 for the 
first 10 years. The rate is projected to increase to $633 for the second 
decade assuming the insured reenters with a medical exam. Without the 
exam, the premium will increase each year starting at a projected rate of 
$1,145 in year 11 and rising to $2,683 in year 20. (Damato, 1995) 
Once new reserve rules take effect, many insurers will probably sell 
policies on which premiums are projected to be level for 10, 15, or 20 
years but are only guaranteed for the first five. (Damato, 1995) 
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Whole Life Insurance Background Information 
Life insurance is purchased to provide for the beneficiaries of 
the insured in case of premature death. The death benefit of the insurance 
policy is supposed to help the beneficiaries maintain their standard of 
living after the insured passes away. Some people use insurance policies 
to help with business or estate planning. 
With income tax rates up to 39.6%, the search for investments with 
tax-free features increases. The tax benefits of the cash value of whole 
life insurance products can be considerable for insureds. (Kiplinger, 
1994) 
A cash-value policy initially builds value from premium payments 
made in excess of insurance costs of the policy. The policy also applies 
the pre-tax interest earned on the cash-value to the cost of current 
insurance protection, then adds the remaining balance to the cash-value. 
As the cash-value increases, it approaches the policy's death benefit. 
(Hansen, 1995) 
Under the whole life insurance contract, the insured pays specified 
premiums at predetermined levels. After the insurance company issues 
the contract, the insured cannot change the annual premium or death 
benefit. With whole life policies, the insurance company credits earnings 
and imposes charges for current insurance protection. The insurance 
company does not show the earnings on the cash value or the expenses for 
current death benefit coverage. These earnings and expenses are implicit 
in the amount of policy dividends paid as additional paid-up insurance. In 
a participating whole life policy, the insurance company allows the policy 
owner to participate in the profits of the insurance company. The 
insurance company may distribute dividends in the form of cash, additions 
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to the cash-value, and/or additional insurance called paid-up additions. 
Whole life policies can result in larger death benefit accumulations due to 
payment of dividends as paid-up insurance. (Hansen, 1995) 
One of the benefits of a whole life insurance policy is that the 
policy owner can take out a tax-free loan secured by the cash-value. 
Although interest is payable on the amount borrowed, the failure to pay 
interest will not result in the policyholder's default. The insurance 
company adds the unpaid interest to the principal of the loan unless the 
total of the debt exceeds the policy's cash-value. (Hansen, 1995) 
The policyholder incurs a minimal interest expense with this type of 
loan because the cash value used as collateral continues to earn interest. 
The policyholder's cost of borrowing equals the difference between the 
interest payable on the loan and the interest credited to the cash value. If 
a policy provides a 2% net interest cost, the loan would incur interest 
charges of 2% above interest paid on the cash value. If the cash value 
earned 7%, the interest payable on the loan would be 9%. (Hansen, 1995) 
Some insurance companies allow policyholders who are terminally 
ill to receive insurance benefits before death. If the insured is expected 
to die within 12 months, proposed regulations allow payments of the 
death benefit before death without any income tax liability to the 
recipient. These proposed IRS regulations recognize that the terminally 
ill need insurance proceeds to pay medical and living expenses prior to 
death. (Hansen, 1995) 
By the end of 1992, sales of traditional whole life insurance 
policies were flat, and the 50 largest life insurers saw the percentage of 
troubled real-estate assets continue to climb from 13% in 1991 to 16% in 
1992 of all real-estate holdings. Consolidation came to many large multi­
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line insurers as rivals like Geico and USAA used direct-to-consumers 
toll-free calling and credit cards sales. They also saw rivals like single­
line A.L. Williams/Primerica Financial Services continue to take their 
business. Some insurance companies have seen whole life insurance sale 
slip significantly in the last decade. Others have revamped their line of 
whole life insurance products and increased sales. This has resulted in 
flat sales for the industry as a whole. (Haggerty, 1995), (Lee, 1993) 
Mass Mutual has been concentrating on promoting needs-based 
products that attempt to cover the entire spectrum of whole life 
insurance needs. Mass Mutual, for example, revamped its traditional 
whole life insurance product beginning in March of 1994. Its new 
Advantage series addresses the growing population of over age 55 clients 
who need strong estate planning tools, small businesses that need wealth 
transfers and business and business succession tools, and the needs of 
young families with limited budgets who require high amounts of life 
insurance protection at affordable prices. (Haggerty, 1995) 
The new whole life insurance products include one with a premium 
that is lower the first five years with a minimum face amount of 
$500,000. It is targeted at the estate planning market where people are 
looking for low initial premiums with the understanding that their ability 
to pay will improve. (Haggerty, 1995) 
John Hancock has maintained its whole life portfolio for the past 
several years, but it has added riders that make the policies more flexible 
in controlling the death benefit and premium patterns. Death benefit 
flexibility can be used by firms which pay the premiums for the employees 
and want to recover the premium when a death occurs. (Haggerty, 1995) 
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However, pure whole life insurance policies are not completely risk­
free. A realistic example of this would be a couple who purchased a 
second-to-die whole life policy from a large, highly rated mutual 
company. A second-to-die policy only provides a death benefit after the 
second person on the policy passes away. The $1 million plan was 
projected to vanish in 10 years on annual premiums of about $10,000. 
This means that after 10 years, the premiums were predicted to be funded 
by current dividends and the liquidating of paid-up additions of life 
insurance. Eight years later, the 10 year vanish had turned into a 
ridiculous 30 years of premium payments. This is not an unusual scenario 
with some whole life policies. (Nisbett, 1995) 
Most whole life policies have experienced increased vanish periods 
as a result of lower than expected investment income. But the effect of 
attaching non-guaranteed term riders to these policies multiplies the 
problem immensely. Term riders are extra term life insurance that are 
added to the initial whole policy. However, these term policies are 
supposed to be paid by future dividends on the existing cash-value. When 
the original vanishing premium concept was introduced participating 
policies were mostly 100% whole life policies projected to vanish in 17 
to 19 years. The trend is toward more term blended contracts which 
provide less guarantees than a straight whole life policy. (Nisbett, 1995) 
Increased competition from universal life and the trend to sell 
premiums and not benefits are the reasons many mutual companies offer 
flexible, non-guaranteed term riders on top of their whole life policies. 
The insurance companies offer the policy owner the option of purchasing 
additional life insurance for a limited period of time in the form of a term 
rider. A policy owner may feel that he/she needs additional insurance on a 
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limited basis for one reason or another. The premiums for these non­
guaranteed term riders are paid by future dividends, and the balance, if 
any, is used to purchase paid-up additions of whole life insurance. 
(Nisbett, 1995) 
The more non-guaranteed term riders that are mixed with whole life 
policies, the more dividend sensitive the contract becomes. Then, if the 
insurer reduces the dividend scale, possibly due to the lower interest rate 
environment, the insured may be in trouble. (Nisbett, 1995) 
Since most term rates are only guaranteed for one year and 
dividends are not guaranteed, an element of risk is added to the policy. If 
the insured accepts this risk, then some insurance companies advocate 
using universal life because of its greater flexibility in premium 
payments, more favorable loan provisions, and sometimes an attractive 
guaranteed death benefit period of up to 40 years. (Nisbett, 1995) 
Adding to this problem is that, back in the late 1970's and during the 
1980's, many stock companies adopted the "quick and liquid" philosophy of 
investing and generated extremely high, short-term rates of return. Most 
mutual companies kept the "strong and long" philosophy. However, the 
~Iigher yielding long term bonds purchased in 1980 are now maturing. Even 
though interest rates have leveled off or increased slightly, the higher 
investment yields 'from the past are being replaced by new, lower yielding 
bonds. This may result in the further deterioration of dividends. (Nisbett, 
1995) 
Comparison of Term to Whole Life Insurance 
Term issued and in force compared to whole issued and in force 
indicates that the balance is in favor of whole. Whole issued changed 
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from 52% to 54% of the total issued, and whole in force changed from 55% 
to 54%. This may be based partly on low premium whole life and universal 
life policies containing significant term portions and little or no cash­
value. (Gold, 1994) 
For anyone stretching his/her budget to buy insurance, term is the 
best choice. It just does not seem wise to spend limited resources on a 
$50,000 whole life policy when $250,000 of coverage is needed. (Davis, 
1994) 
This makes PFS' middle income customers prime candidates for the 
BTIO strategy. The average age of a PFS customer is 35 with an annual 
household income under $50,000. Young parents often need large amounts 
of insurance and few can spare the $3,000 or so a year it would take to 
fund a $250,000 cash-value policy. (Davis, 1994) 
Even if buying a whole-life policy was a mistake in the first place 
getting out too soon could be a worse move. Give up the policy too soon 
and the insured forfeits the stiff up-front expenses paid as well as the 
long-term tax benefits that were probably the reason for buying the policy 
in the first place. (Davis, 1994) 
Northwestern Mutual is the insurance company I used to provide the 
whole life insurance policy to compare to the BTIO strategy in this 
project. Northwestern Mutual is a large mutual life insurance company 
based in Milwaukee with total admitted assets of $53.2 billion and 
adjusted surplus of $4.4 billion as of September 30, 1995. The company 
provides life insurance, disability insurance, and both fixed and variable 
annuities. Northwestern Mutual's market niche is low cost, high quality 
products to the personal and advanced market which consists of closely 
held companies, professionals, and estate planning. (PR Newswire, 1996) 
18 
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Duff and Phelps Credit Rating Company recently renewed its AAA 
rating of Northwestern Mutual, the highest rating available. Duff and 
Phelps singled out the firm's lower-than-average mortality experience 
indicative of strong underwriting. Duff and Phelps also noted its long­
term total return investment philosophy and the high persistency of its 
policyholders. Company figures indicate that only about 4% of all 
Northwestern Mutual policyholders let their policies lapse. (Olsen, 1996) 
The National Insurance Consumer Organization (NICO) analyzed a 
$100,000 whole life policy from Northwestern Mutual Life to see how 
much someone would have to earn under a BTl D scenario to match the 
earnings of the whole life policy. NICO found that an owner who bailed out 
after five years would have needed to earn just 3.6% after taxes on the 
"difference" to come out ahead. Over ten years, the same policyholder 
would need to earn more than 7% to come out ahead and over 15 years 8%. 
In fact for a whole life policy to average 8% over 15 years, it has to earn a 
far higher rate than that in the later years to make up for the low rate in 
the early years. Most experts would claim that the worst time to 
surrender a whole life policy is in the early years when the surrender 
penalties are stiff and the cash value has not really started to accumulate 
yet. (Davis, 1994) 
The money PFS policyholders save by buying term, as well as any 
cash value they get when they replace another policy, often ends up in 
Primerica's family of mutual funds, the Common Sense funds. The growth 
and growth/income funds have provided respectable annual average 
returns of 9.7% and 8.5% respectively over five years. In both cases, this 
is about average for funds with similar objective. However, these funds 
carry 8.5% front-end sales loads, the highest allowed by law. The five 
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year average annual return adjusted to reflect the sales loads dropped to 
7.7% and 6.6%. (Davis, 1994) 
These loads are another reason policyholders need to be careful 
when rolling over an existing whole life policy into a BTl D plan. When the 
initial transaction is finished 8% of the money could be spent right away 
due to sales fees. The rest is invested in potentially risky mutual funds. 
(Davis, 1994) 
Mutual Funds 
A mutual fund is a company that invests on behalf of individuals 
and/or institutions with similar financial goals. By combining the 
financial resources of thousands of shareholders, mutual fund investors 
all realize the same bene'fit: professional management, diversified 
ownership in the securities market, and a variety of services not 
otherwise available to most individuals. (Mutual Fund Fact Book, 1995) 
The mutual fund industry acts as an important bridge between 
investors and security issuers. It helps millions of mutual fund 
shareholders reach their investment goals, while assisting U.S. economic 
growth through participation in the debt and equity markets. Over the 
past dozen years, it has grown into the nation's second largest financial 
intermediary with $2.16 trillion in assets. (Mutual Fund Fact Book, 1995) 
Since 1940, when Congress enacted the Investment Company Act, the 
mutual fund industry has grown from 68 funds to over 5000 funds and 
increased from $448 million to about $2.2 trillion. Mutual funds have 
developed into an important investment vehicle for U.S. investors serving 
more than 38 million individual investors and representing 31% of all U.S. 
households. (Mutual Fund Fact Book, 1995) 
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Money managers select securities (stocks, bonds, etc.) that meet 
their fund's investment objectives. Investment objectives are usually 
described in terms of one or more main goals. These may include growth, 
income, stability, or some combination thereof. (Mutual Fund Fact Book, 
1995) 
Mutual funds make money for shareholders three basic ways. First, 
if the value of the securities held by the fund increase, then the value of 
the fund's entire portfolio increases as well. Second, mutual funds may 
pay dividends to shareholders. For example if a fund's objective is current 
income, it will invest in stocks and bonds expected to produce current 
dividends or interest. The 'fund then distributes these earnings to its 
shareholders as dividends. T~lird, if a 'fund manager sells a security that 
has increased in value, shareholders will have realized a capital gain and 
will receive a distribution. Shareholders may choose to reinvest 
dividends and capital gains in the purchase of additional fund shares. 
(Mutual Fund Fact Book, 1995) 
Under the Internal Revenue code, mutual funds that meet certain 
requirements serve as conduits through which the income and gains earned 
from underlying securities pass through to shareholders without any tax 
due from the mutual fund itself. Any income and capital gains, by law, are 
also passed on to the fund's shareholders. Mutual funds, unlike bank 
depositories, are not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Depository 
Insurance Corporation. Mutual funds involve investment risk, including the 
possible loss of principal. (Mutual Fund Fact Book, 1995) 
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 states that mutual fund 
shareholders are generally taxed as if they were direct owners of a 
proportionate interest in the fund's portfolio of securities. Unlike must 
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received by the shareholders. This pass-through tax treatment of income 
and capital gains is only available to funds that qualify as regulated 
investment companies under Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code. 
(Svare, 1992), (Mutual Fund Fact Book, 1995) 
A fund must meet several Subchapter M requirements, including the 
distribution of 90% of its investment income per year as well as 
following various rules of asset diversi'fication. A fund also must receive 
less than 30% of its gross income from the sale of securities held less 
than three months. This one-level tax results from the deductions that 
funds receive for amounts distributed to shareholders. In addition, to 
avoid the imposition of an additional excise tax, a fund generally 
distributes 98% of its income in the calendar year in which the income is 
earned. (Mutual Fund Fact Book, 1995) 
Shifts in the distribution of mutual fund assets that began in the 
early 1980's have continued in to the 1990's. In 1982 and earlier, assets 
where heavily concentrated in money market mutual funds as a result of 
rising interest rates, low stock prices, and a recession. By 1984, the 
percentage of assets in money market funds began to decline, In 1984, 
taxable money market funds represented 56.6% of all mutual fund assets 
down from 69.6% in 1982. Equity funds represented 22.4% of all fund 
assets in 1984, bond and income funds were 14.6%, and tax-exempt money 
market funds were 6.4%. By the end of 1994, almost 75% of mutual fund 
assets were invested in long-term funds. (Mutual Fund Fact Book, 1995) 
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Methodology 
The whole life insurance policy I chose to use was from 
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance. Northwestern Mutual Life is a well 
respected, conservative insurance company. It is highly rated by the 
rating companies such as Duff and Phelps and has a reputation of being a 
low cost provider of life insurance. The policy used was the Select 100 
preferred/nonsmoker participating whole life policy. The death benefit 
was initially $100,000, and the insured was a 35 year old male. The 
premium payments were projected to disappear in 10 years from the time 
of the contract date. After 10 years, the premiums would be funded by 
current dividends and the liquidation of paid-up additions. 
The term life insurance policy was from The Travelers Insurance. 
The reason Travelers was chosen was because of its association with 
Primerica Financial Services, the dominant term provider in the industry. 
Primerica Financial Services bought The Travelers Insurance Company in 
1993 and adopted its name. A $100,000 ART policy was used for the 
simulation in this project. The insured was, once again, a 35 year old 
male who qualified for the preferred/nonsmoker discount. The policy was 
guaranteed renewable to age 75. This policy was also convertible to some 
type of permanent policy until age 65. 
In this project, a hypothetical term life policy was purchased from 
Travelers Insurance and the money saved from not buying the whole life 
policy from Northwestern Mutual was invested separately. The 
"difference" was invested using six different strategies over a 20 year 
period. These six strategies represent a range of risk choices. For the 
ultra-conservative investor, the "difference" was invested in 91 day 
Treasury Bills. In order to portray a person who knows the benefits of 
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owning a diverse portfolio of stock, the money saved was invested in the 
S&P 500 by way of a mutual fund. This mutual fund would mirror the S&P 
500 by owning all the stocks in the index in the same percentages as the 
actual S&P 500. Any time a new stock is added to the actual S&P 500, the 
same change must be made to the respective mutual fund. 
For the remaining four investments, 20 year annual returns were 
unavailable. As a result, it was assumed that the insured would be very 
risk averse for the first ten years of the policy. This means the insured 
would invest the "difference" in 91 day Treasury Bills which are risk free 
for all practical purposes. For the second ten years, the insured would re­
evaluate the rate of return and shift the savings into various mutual 
funds. It is assumed that the policy owner has the knowledge and ability 
to make such a drastic change in his/her savings. If the returns had been 
available for all twenty years for the various mutual funds, the portfolio 
values would have been ~Iigher as well. This would have affected the final 
results of the simulation in this project. 
The first fund is an asset allocation or flexible strategy fund. These 
funds give the money managers the greatest flexibility in anticipating and 
responding to economic changes. The portfolio could be entirely invested 
in stocks, bonds, or money markets at any given time depending on market 
conditions. T~lis type of fund was used to represent the type of investor 
who is less conservative than a money market investor but is still 
unwilling to be too dependent on any single income or equity instrument 
without the ability to change quicl<ly. (Mutual Fund Fact Book, 1994) 
The second fund used is a balanced fund. This type of fund generally 
has three investment objectives. First is to conserve the principal of the 
investor. Next the fund aims to provide current income and finally to 
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promote long-term growth of principal and income. Balanced funds often 
I,ave a predetermined mix of stocks, bonds, money markets, and cash. This 
type of objective is used to represent the type of investor that is less 
risk averse than the asset allocation investor but is still unwilling to be 
too heavily invested in any single market. (Mutual Fund Fact Book, 1994) 
A long-term growth type of fund is also used. This type of fund 
invests in common stocks of well established companies. This fund's goal 
is capital appreciation over time and not so much dividend or current 
income. This fund is for people who understand the benefits of being in 
the stock market but are unwilling to play the market or stray away from 
established companies. (Mutual Fund Fact Book, 1994) 
Finally a maximum or aggressive growth strategy is used for the 
people willing to allow a fund manger to "play" the equity market with 
their money. The goal of this type of fund is to obtain maximum capital 
gains over time. Some aggressive funds invest in stocks of businesses 
somewhat of out the mainstream, such as new companies just starting. 
out, new industries, or potential turn-around companies. Some of these 
funds use various derivative techniques in order to maximize capital 
gains. (Mutual Fund Fact Book, 1994) 
The information about the mutual funds average annual returns was 
obtained from CDAlWeisenberger Mutual Fund Panorama 1995. The life 
insurance policy information was obtained from Best's Flitcraft Compend 
Life-Health 1993 Edition. A 28% tax bracket was assumed for tax 
purposes. However, results are also provided for a tax-deferred 
investment strategy through an IRA or annuity as well. 
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After five years of using a BIID strategy the insured would have 
accumulated $7,301 by investing in 91 day Treasury Bills and $8,088 by 
investing in the S&P 500 adjusted for taxes. Without taxes, investor 
would have $7,852 and $8,458 respectively. This compares to the whole 
life policy in which the surrender value is only $4,427, and the death 
benefit is already over $100,000. This is because the whole life policy is 
participating in the earnings of Northwestern Mutual. These earnings are 
distributed as dividends in the form of paid-up additions of insurance 
which add to the cash-value of the policy as well. (Refer to Appendix A-­
Part 1 for a diagram of the Bll D strategy. Refer to Appendix A--Part 2 
A, B, & C for diagrams of how pre-tax numbers were adjusted for tax 
purposes. Refer to Table 2 for a 20 year summary of capital gains and 
dividends used in the calculations of the tax adjustments.) 
After 10 years of investing in 91 day Treasury Bills, the insured 
would have accumulated $17,857 after taxes and $20,999 before taxes.. By 
investing for 10 years in a mutual fund that followed the S&P 500, the 
investor would have $23,306 after taxes and $25,454 before. The 
surrender value is only $14,646 after taxes at this point. (Refer to Table 
1--Part A and C for a summary of the Bll D strategy after 5 and 10 
years and the surrender value of the whole life policy after 5 and 10 
years.) 
Table 1 shows that it would not be in the best interest of a 
policyholder to surrender a whole life policy after 5 or even 10 years. The 
BIID strategy, even by "investing the difference" in 91 day Treasury Bills, 
shows a higher value than the surrender value of the whole life policy. 
The surrender charges on the Northwestern Mutual policy are too great 
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after 5 and 10 years to make the whole life policy competitive with the 
BTID strategy at this point. 
The next 10 years are a little more complicated. It is assumed that 
under the remaining four scenarios, the investor decided to readjust 
his/her investment objective. The 91 day Treasury Bill value in 1984 was 
used for all of the second ten year objectives as the beginning balance for 
1985 except the S&P 500. After 20 years of investing in just the S&P 
500, the accumulation would be $76,715 adjusted for taxes and $113,904 
without the adjustment. The 91 day Treasury Bills investment would have 
a value of $37,381 and $48,150 without an adjustment for taxes. After 
investing for the first 10 years in 91 day Treasury Bills and the second 10 
years in one of the aforementioned mutual funds, the returns are as 
follows: 
The pre-tax value of the asset allocation fund was $70,689 and 
after taxes is was $50,412. Before taxes the balanced fund total value 
was $75,986 and after taxes it decreased to $54,190. The maximum 
growth fund would have accumulated $87,703 before taxes and $62,443 
after taxes. The long-term growth fund would have a value of $88,970 
before taxes and $63,221 after taxes have been deducted. These values 
would be compared to the surrender value of the whole life policy after 20 
years of $56,125 before taxes. However, after taxes are taken out of the 
surrender value over the premiums paid into the policy by the policy 
owner, the actual surrender value after 20 years would be $47,975. The 
death benefit would be $152,419 after 20 years as well. (Refer to Table 
1--Part Band C for a summary of the BTID strategy after 20 years and 
the surrender value of the whole life policy after 20 years.) 
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The average return for the whole life policy over the 20 year period 
before taxes was 7.12%. The average return before taxes for the various 
investments over the 20 years were 14.47% for the S&P 500, 7.49% for the 
91 day Treasury Bill, 9.28% for the 91 Treasury Bill/asset allocation fund 
mix, 10.28% for the 91 day Treasury Bill/balanced fund mix, 11.09% for 
the 91 day Treasury Bill/maximum growth mix, and 11.21 % for the 91 day 
Treasury Bill/long-term growth 'fund. (Refer to Table 3 for a 10 and 20 
year summary of the geometric mean returns for the 91-day Treasury 
Bills and mutual funds used in the BTIO strategy.) 
See Spreadsheets 1 and 2 after the Works Cited for data used 
above. 
Conclusions 
This research indicates that whole life insurance is a product that 
works for some people in specific situations. I attempted to use a 
representative sample of the entire investment strategy spectrum in 
order to make the BTIO strategy as viable as possible. 
An investor can benefit from the BTIO strategy under certain 
circumstances as well. The investor must realize that even though the 
term policy is cheaper on the surface, it is not necessarily a sure win 
proposition. For example, if the insured uses a BTIO strategy and is very 
conservative, he/she may put the money into a money market fund or 91 
day Treasury Bills. The annual return on a money market fund would be 
very close to the returns on the 91 day Treasury Bills. The return on this 
type of investment, for the 20 year period from 1975 to 1994, would be 
only 7.49% before taxes. The value of this investment, after taxes, would 
be $37,381. If the ART policy lapsed at age 65, the insured would only 
have $37,381 saved for retirement or anything else the money may have 
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been intended for. If the money had been invested the same way but in an 
IRA, the value would have been $48,150. This is only if the current IRA 
regulations allowed the insured to invest the full "difference" in the fund 
in the first place. Once payments begin to be withdrawn from an IRA, the 
payments become taxable too. This money may not be enough to provide 
for any dependents in case of a premature death. Also the insured may not 
be insurable anymore if he/she were to reapply for reinstatement. This 
would leave the person without enough money to cover anything 
unexpected. 
On the other hand, if the whole policy were surrendered after 20 
years, the cash value would be $56,124. This may not be enough to retire 
comfortably on, but it is more than the BTl D strategy was worth. Also, 
this money is non-taxable unless the cash-value is more than the premium 
payments. In this case, $27,020 was paid in premiums, so $29,104 would 
be taxable at the 28% tax rate in this case. This would leave a surrender 
value of $47,975 after taxes. Also, if the policy is not surrendered, the 
insured can take out a loan against the cash-value. This loan is not 
considered income unless the policy lapses. This interest on the loan is 
mainly paid by the interest earned on the remaining cash-value. If the 
loan is not repaid by the time the insured passes away, the interest 
payments are added on to the principal which is then subtracted from the 
death benefit. In this case, the death benefit was $152,419, and the 
initial policy taken out was only for $100,000. The insured may not care 
if a little of the death benefit were subtracted to cover the loan. Also, if 
the insured dies while the term policy was in force, the beneficiaries 
would receive the $100,000 death benefit plus the $37,381 that was 
saved. Even with the forfeiture of the cash-value of the whole life policy, 
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the beneficiaries would still receive more money and it may be a tax-free 
transfer as well. 
Another aspect of the whole life policy is that the cash-value and 
paid-up additions were predicted to fund the premiums after year ten of 
the policy being in force. This means that premium payments would be 
made with pre-tax dollars and the insured would have to pay only the first 
ten years of premiums out-of-pocket--$13,510 not $27,020. Also, the 
BTl D strategy is based on investing the "difference" which means the 
policy owner will incur the same out-of-pocket expense whether using a 
BTID strategy or buying a whole life policy. This scenario may make the 
whole life policy very attractive to some people. The insured must also 
consider how easy it is to qualify for the preferred/nonsmoker rates for a 
particular insurance company. T~lis could dramatically influence the cost 
of the insurance policy over the long run. 
However, another scenario may make the BTID appear far superior to 
whole life insurance. In this case, the insured invests the "difference". in 
a mutual fund that mirrors the S&P 500. After 20 years of investing in 
this fashion, the insured would have accumulated $113,904 without a tax 
adjustment and $76,715 after taxes. If the money is put into an IRA or 
some other tax-deferred vehicle, the liquidity and regulatory problems 
discussed above apply again. But, if the insured invests the money in a 
simple taxable mutual fund, this problem would not exist. If the term 
policy were allowed to lapse after 20 years, the person would have 
$76,715 to apply towards retirement. This would be compared to the 
surrender value of the whole life policy of $47,975. The investor would 
still have the loan options with the whole policy that are not available 
with the term policy though. However, if the insured died at the end of the 
30
 
•
 
term policy period, the dependents would receive the death benefit of 
$100,000 and would still have the savings of $76,715. If the insured died 
after 20 years with the whole life policy in force, the dependents would 
receive the death benefit of $152,419, but the cash-value would be 
surrendered to Northwestern Mutual. This scenario also assumes that the 
insured is persistent about making the regular investments of the 
"difference" into the mutual fund. The "difference" in this scenario would 
have earned an average annual return over the 20 year time period of 
14.27%. This type of return is possible as the research indicates, but it 
cannot be expected every period or even over an extended length of time. 
Something else to keep in mind when trying to determine whether to 
purchase term or whole life insurance is that many advocates of the BTl D 
strategy claim than an insured should decrease the death benefit of the 
term policy as retirement approaches and the need to insure premature 
death declines. This would hypothetically decrease premium payments or 
at least keep them at about the same level. This seems like it would 
work, but it is not always plausible. Travelers Insurance, for example, 
will not write a term life insurance policy for less than $100,000. As the 
initial death benefit was only $100,000 the insured would not be able to 
decrease the death benefit at all. However, inflation would cause the real 
value of the death bene'fit to be less than the initial $100,000 anyway. 
A close to break-even scenario might be using a BTID strategy and 
investing the money in 91 day Treasury Bills for ten years and an asset 
allocation mutual fund for the second ten years. The combined average 
annual return from 1975 to 1994 was 9.82% before taxes. This would 
produce an investment worth $70,690 before taxes and $50,412 after 
taxes. Assuming the money was invested in a regular taxable asset 
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allocation mutual fund, the insured would have $50,412 if the term policy 
was allowed to lapse. If the whole life policy were surrendered at this 
point, the insured would receive $47,975 slightly less than the value of 
the "difference". However, if the insured died while the term policy was 
in force, the beneficiaries would receive the $100,000 plus the $50,412 
already saved. If the person died while the whole life policy was in force, 
the beneficiaries would receive $152,419 slightly more than the BTID 
strategy. 
These scenarios show that under certain circumstances whole life 
insurance may be more appropriate than term and vice versa. If the 
insured is very risk averse, is very financially stable, has long-term 
insurance needs, or just does not have the time or knowledge to "invest 
the difference" on his/her own, then whole life may be the better choice. 
However, if the insured knows a lot about the financial markets, is risk 
tolerant, has short-term life insurance needs, or has limited resources, a 
"buy term and invest the difference" strategy may be the more relevant 
choice. 
On the flip side, these scenarios have implications for the insurance 
companies. Instead of name calling when a company like Primerica 
Financial Services actually realizes what the rest of the industry does 
not, they should follow suit. Primerica, among a limited number of others, 
has realized that the market for life insurance is segmented. Primerica, 
USAA, Ouotesmith, and all the other single-line and specialty insurance 
companies have finally begun to make the leap toward being a customer 
focused service provider. Ouotesmith markets its insurance products 
primarily through direct mail to people that have some knowledge of life 
insurance and therefore do not need an agent as a consultant. USAA 
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couples the direct mail with an 800 number for prospective customers to 
use. Primerica markets its term products primarily to people with a 
household income of $50,000 or less and are around 35 years old. 
Considering the fact that there are so many providers of insurance, 
most of which offer more than one insurance product, it seems to me that 
the days of mass marketing in print or on television supplemented by 
whatever the individual agents do are over. Insurance companies do not 
necessarily have to become a single-line provider or make agents entirely 
obsolete, but they need to reevaluate their marketing techniques. 
Insurance companies must integrate different marketing techniques into 
their overall marketing plan by using direct mail, telemarketing, the 
internet, or some other means in order to survive in the ever changing 
competitive environment that we live in. Insurance companies must 
recognize that the consumers buying life insurance are not homogeneous. 
There are different market segments that have different wants and needs 
that must be targeted as such. It would seem like the various life 
insurance products were created, in the first place, to address the diverse 
group of people in the market today. However, the industry as a whole has 
not taken this concept to the next level and actually targeted the 
segments with the products best suited for them. 
A term or whole life insurance policy is essentially the same no 
matter which company provides it. Insurance companies need to 
differentiate themselves from other companies. As a result insurance 
companies must market themselves as better or at least different in some 
way than the other companies within the industry. If the insurance 
company is a low cost provider of whole life insurance like Northwestern 
Mutual Life then the segment of the market that it should target would 
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probably be financially stable families with long-term insurance needs. 
These families may need some help in planning their estate as well. 
Northwestern Mutual Life should not target 35 year old people who make 
less than $50,000 a year. These people just do not have the right 
demographics for Northwestern Mutual's whole life products. If 
Northwestern Mutual wants to target these people too then they need to 
market a different product to them. These people need to be marketed to 
differently as they have different needs. If Northwestern Mutual does not 
want to take the time to find out who the term life insurance customer 
really is then Northwestern Mutual should just concentrate on the 
customer demographics it knows best. The other customers should be left 
to companies like USAA or Quotesmith who can provide better service for 
them. 
Insurance companies need to recognize that these segments exist 
among the customers in the insurance industry. On the other hand, 
consumers need to realize that there are a wide array of products, each 
with its own merits, offered by a large number of insurance companies. 
My research indicates that no single product is far superior to the rest. 
This means the insurance companies must market themselves in a way to 
make their products seem different and/or better. If the insurance 
companies capitalized on their strengths and stopped using unnecessary 
name calling as a marketing tool, the industry as a whole would be much 
better off. The insurance companies would, ideally, target the customers 
that are most likely to buy their products. Insurance companies would 
also be selling the best product for the respective customer and not just 
the product that earns the most commission. This would ultimately be in 
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the best long-term interest for both the insurance company and the 
consumer. 
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Table 1 
A. Five and Ten Year Summary of Returns for BTIO 
5 yr. returns 10 yr. returns
 
without tax after tax without tax after tax
 
S&P 500 $8,458.45 $8,088.31 $25,454.26 $23,306.73 
91 T-Bill $7,852.26 $7,301.17 $20,999.57 $17,857.49 
B. 20 Year Summary of Returns for B,.IO 
without taxes after taxes 
S&P 500 $113,904.07 $76,715.40 
91 T-BIII $48,150.26 $37,381.08 
91 T-Bill/Asset All. $70,689.93 $50,412.46 
91 T-BIII/Balanced $75,986.40 $54,190.83 
91 T-B III/Max. Growth $87,703.03 $62,443.05 
91 T-BIII/Lona Term Grth $88,970.45 $63,221.20 
C. Five/Ten/Twenty Year Surrender Value of Whole Life Policy 
5 yr. value 10 yr. value 20 yr. value 
$15,090 $14,646 
before tax/after tax 
$4,427 
before tax after tax after tax 
$56,124 $47,975 
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Table 2 
Capital Gains and Dividends 20 Year Summary 
S&P 500 91T-Bil AssetAI Balance MaxGrth LTGrth 
1975 4.08% 5.40% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1976 3.77% 5.00% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1977 4.91% 6.20% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1978 5.28% 9.80% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1979 5.28% 12.80% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1980 4.54% 15.10% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1981 5.41% 12.90% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1982 4.88% 7.90% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1983 4.30% 8.90% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1984 4.50% 10.10% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1985 3.74% 7.10% 4.30% 6.99% 7.13% 7.08% 
1986 3.42% 5.20% 8.16% 9.56% 9.38% 9.39% 
1987 3.57% 6.10% 12.78% 12.14% 12.07% 12.09% 
1988 3.50% 7.10% 10.99% 8.07% 8.07% 8.11% 
1989 3.13% 7.80% 9.44% 8.68% 8.80% 8.81% 
1990 3.66% 7.50% 9.97% 9.27% 9.33% 9.34% 
1991 2.93% 5.70% 5.95% 6.12% 6.09% 6.12% 
1992 2.84% 3.40% 7.14% 7.34% 7.43% 7.41% 
1993 2.70% 2.70% 7.20% 7.16% 7.25% 7.27% 
1994 2.87% 4.10% 5.98% 5.87% 5.88% 5.92% 
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-Table 3 
10 and 20 Year Summary of Geometric Mean Returns 
First 10 Yrs. Second 10 Yrs. Total After 20 Yrs. 
S&P 500 14.74% 14.20% 14.47% 
91 day T-Bills 9.36% 5.66% 7.49% 
91 T-Bill/Asset AI1.1 9.36% 10.28% 9.82% 
91 T-Bill/Balanced1 9.36% 11.21 % 10.28% 
91 T-Bill/Max. Growth1 9.36% 12.85% 11.09% 
91 T-Bill/LT. Grth.1 9.36% 13.08% 11.21% 
1 Second 10 Yrs. numbers are for the respective mutual funds solely. 
Only the Total After 20 Yrs. takes into account the 91 day Treasury 
Bills used for the first 10 years of the simulation. 
38
 
Appendix A 
Part 1--8110 Diagram 
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Examples: 
1st year Premium 
$1,351 $129 = $1,222 
2nd year Premium 
$1,351 $138 = $1,213 
Part 2--Adjustment for taxes assuming 28% tax bracket 
A. 91 day Treasury Bill 
Northwestern "Difference"Travelers 
Mutual Whole InvestedART Policy 
Life Policy SeparatelyPremium 
Premium 
Portfolio 
end of year 
Value 
"Difference" 
- L..._In_v_es_te_d_----I X[ Separately 
% AnnualRetur  
Income Tax AfterTax 
X Rate - Portfolio 
] Value 
1...­ ----1 
Example: 1975 
$(1,351-129) x 1.054 ­ [($1,351 - $129) x 5.4% x 28%] = 
$1,269.51 
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Dividends in 
Index Form 
% Distributions 
ofS&P 500 
S&P 500 
Index Value 
Example: 1994 
13.18 I 459.27 = 2.87% 
Portfolio 
end of year 
Value 
Portfolio 
- end of year X 
[ Value 
% Distributions 
of S&P 500 
X I_nc_o_m_e_T_ax_......Rate ] __...._A_f_te_r_Tax_----'Portfolio 
Value 
L-
Example: 1994 
($76,558.47 + 1,351 - 673) x 1.0013 - [(($76,558.47 + 1,351 - 673) 
x 1.0013) x 2.87% x 28%] = $76,715.40 
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c. Mutual Funds 
• 
Total % Investment Objective 
Distributions for is of total net assets
 
specific year
 
X 
for mutual funds % Distributions 
of 
Net Assets for Investment Mutual Fund 
Objective in specific year 
Example: 1993 Asset Allocation Mutual Fund 
($109,407.70 x 2.3%) I $34,973.60 = 
PortfolioPortfolio % Distributions
 
end of year
 - end of year X of 
[ ValueValue Mutual Fund 
AfterTaxIncome Tax 
X - PortfolioRate 
] ValueL....- ..... 
Example: 1993 Asset Allocation Mutual Fund 
($45,916.86 + $1,351 - $627) x 1.137 - [(($45,916.86 + $1,351 ­
$627) x 1.137) x 7.2% x 28%] = $51,961.56 
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Spreadsheet 1-- Adjusted for taxes 
S&P 500 
91 T-Bill 
1975 
37.16% 
5.40% 
Asset-All 
Balanced 
MaxGrth 
LTGrowth 
S&P 500 
91 T-Bill 
1985 
18.60% 
26.10% 
28.30% 
29.20% 
31.50% 
7.10% 
IP= $1,351.00 
Total Prem 
Total Divd's 
Total DB 
Total SurV 
Guan.CV 
IP= $129.00 
Total Premo 
Taxes Deducted 
BTIO 1975 
S&P 500 $1,656.95 
91 T-Bill $1,269.51 
BTIO 1985 
Asset-All $22,116.79 
Balanced $23,336.14 
MaxGrth $23,733.78 
LTGrowth $23,903.68 
S&P 500 $23,959.91 
91 T-Bill $19,838.61 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1978 
23.57% -7.42% 6.38% 18.20% 32.27% 
5.00% 6.20% 9.80% 12.80% 15.10% 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
13.20% 6.20% 10.40% 17.40% -0.10% 
16.10% 2.60% 11.70% 18.70% -0.80% 
13.60% -0.40% 13.10% 26.40% -9.30% 
14.70% 2.70% 15.00% 26.30% -4.70% 
18.56% 5.10% 16.60% 31.70% -3.10% 
5.20% 6.10% 7.10% 7.80% 7.50% 
35 Year old male, $100,000 Select 100 (Pref/NS)-NW Mutual Life 
5 yrs 10 yrs 20 yrs 
$5,755.00 $13,510.00 $27,020.00 
$394.00 $2,959.00 $14,250.00 
$101,711.00 $111,838.00 $152,419.00 
$4,427.00 $15,090.00 $56,124.00 
$4,010.00 $11,488.00 $31,643.00 
35 Year old male, $100,000 ART (Pref/NS)-Travelers Insurance 
5 yrs 10 yrs 20 yrs 
$738.00 $1,848.00 $6,737.00 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
$3,508.96 $4,303.27 $5,762.59 $8,088.31 $12,090.30 
$2,571.88 $3,944.44 $5,502.08 $7,301.17 $9,392.16 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
$25,559.26 $27,155.10 $30,048.62 $35,363.03 $35,171.76 
$27,486.64 $28,195.15 $31,794.40 $37,854.64 $37,403.25 
$27,348.55 $27,243.39 $31,140.79 $39,490.55 $35,637.45 
$27,802.33 $28,539.95 $33,117.49 $41,893.17 $39,673.60 
$29,297.34 $31,483.63 $37,420.45 $50,013.98 $48,786.89 
$21,608.43 $23,560.68 $25,739.49 $28,126.06 $30,546.04 
1981 1982 1983 
-5.01% 21.44% 23.80% 
12.90% 7.90% 8.90% 
1991 1992 1993 
20.90% 7.60% 13.70% 
25.50% 7.90% 11.30% 
47.70% 8.10% 16.10% 
35.90% 8.80% 11.80% 
30.50% 7.60% 10.10% 
5.70% 3.40% 2.70% 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1981 
$12,390.19 
$11,525.69 
1991 
$42,777.20 
$47,135.83 
$52,914.92 
$54,074.43 
$64,192.95 
$32,642.89 
ART Prem rates 
$129.00 11 
$138.00 12 
$147.00 13 
$156.00 14 
$168.00 15 
$181.00 16 
$197.00 17 
$218.00 18 
$243.00 19 
$271.00 20 
1982 1983 
$16,198.16 $21,167.07 
$13,378.71 $15,415.02 
1992 1993 
$45,916.86 $51,961.56 
$50,624.88 $56,005.53 
$56,822.90 $65,455.67 
$58,429.50 $64,787.40 
$69,341.09 $76,558.47 
$34,227.77 $35,631.23 
1984 1O-gmean 
6.10% 14.74% 
10.10% 9.36% 244.72% 
1994 10-gmean 20-gmean 
-2.60% 10.28% 9.82% 
-2.80% 11.21% 10.28% 
-4.00% 12.85% 11.09% 
-1.80% 13.08% 11.21% 
0.13% 14.20% 14.47% 
4.10% 5.66% 7.49% 
$333.00 
$361.00 
$390.00 
$424.00 
$460.00 
$496.00 
$541.00 
$584.00 
$627.00 
$673.00 
1984 
$23,306.73 
$17,857.49 
1994 
$50,412.46 
$54,190.83 
$62,443.05 
$63,221.40 
$76,715.40 
$37,381.08 
Spreadsheet·· 2 Not Adjusted for taxes 
1975 
S&P 500 37.16% 
91 T-Bill 5.40% 
1985 
Asset-All 18.60% 
Balanced 26.10% 
MaxGrth 28.30% 
LTGrowth 29.20% 
S&P 500 31.50% 
91 T-Bill 7.10% 
IP= $1,351.00 
Total Prem 
Total Divd's 
Total DB 
Total SurV 
Guan.CV 
IP= $129.00 
Total Premo 
No Taxes 
BTID 1975 
S&P 500 $1,676.10 
91 T-Bill $1,287.99 
BTID 1985 
Asset-All $26,112.83 
Balanced $27,764.15 
MaxGrth $28,248.54 
LTGrowth $28,446.69 
S&P 500 $34,811.03 
91 T-Bill $23,580.81 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1978 
23.57% -7.42% 6.38% 18.20% 32.27% 
5.00% 6.20% 9.80% 12.80% 15.10% 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
13.20% 6.20% 10.40% 17.40% -0.10% 
16.10% 2.60% 11.70% 18.70% -0.80% 
13.60% -0.40% 13.10% 26.40% -9.30% 
14.70% 2.70% 15.00% 26.30% -4.70% 
18.56% 5.10% 16.60% 31.70% -3.10% 
5.20% 6.10% 7.10% 7.80% 7.50% 
35 Year old male, $100,000 Select 100 (Pref/NS)-NW Mutual Life 
5yrs 10 yrs 20 yrs 
$5,755.00 $13,510.00 $27,020.00 
$394.00 $2,959.00 $14,250.00 
$101,711.00 $111,838.00 $152,419.00 
$4,427.00 $15,090.00 $56,124.00 
$4,010.00 $11,488.00 $31,643.00 
35 Year old male, $100,000 ART (Pref/NS)-Travelers Insurance 
5 yrs 10 yrs 20 yrs 
$738.00 $1,848.00 $6,737.00 
1976 1977 1978 1979 19780 
$3,570.05 $4,419.82 $5,973.05 $8,458.45 $12,735.55 
$2,626.04 $4,067.50 $5,778.22 $7,852.26 $10,384.62 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
$30,680.41 $33,603.17 $38,121.31 $45,800.45 $46,608.80 
$33,383.57 $35,237.53 $40,395.78 $49,007.40 $49,463.50 
$33,214.98 $34,039.27 $39,546.86 $51,113.45 $47,135.38 
$33,763.89 $35,662.46 $42,077.88 $54,269.69 $52,533.83 
$42,445.70 $45,620.44 $54,274.31 $72,652.72 $71,228.98 
$25,848.49 $28,444.87 $31,457.28 $34,871.44 $38,405.93 
1981 
-5.01% 
12.90% 
1991 
20.90% 
25.50% 
47.70% 
35.90% 
30.50% 
5.70% 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1981 
$13,193.68 
$13,027.11 
1991 
$57,329.33 
$63,093.25 
$70,815.33 
$72,494.27 
$94,010.87 
$41,451.23 
1982 1983 1984 
21.44% 23.80% 6.10% 
7.90% 8.90% 10.10% 
1992 1993 1994 
7.60% 13.70% -2.60% 
7.90% 11.30% -2.80% 
8.10% 16.10% -4.00% 
8.80% 11.80% -1.80% 
7.60% 10.10% 0.13% 
3.40% 2.70% 4.10% 
ART Prem rates 
$129.00 11 $333.00 
$138.00 12 $361.00 
$147.00 13 $390.00 
$156.00 14 $424.00 
$168.00 15 $460.00 
$181.00 16 $496.00 
$197.00 17 $541.00 
$218.00 18 $584.00 
$243.00 19 $627.00 
$271.00 20 $673.00 
1982 1983 1984 
$17,398.32 $22,910.82 $25,454.26 
$15,278.75 $17,845.17 $20,999.57 
1992 1993 1994 
$62,511.65 $71,898.93 $70,689.93 
$68,905.21 $77,497.31 $75,986.40 
$77,380.50 $90,679.32 $87,703.03 
$79,708.26 $89,923.27 $88,970.45 
$101,980.98 $113,078.19 $113,904.07 
$43,653.65 $45,575.85 $48,150.26 
